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Abstract 
Calls for interdisciplinary research practice are an increasingly ubiquitous 
feature of contemporary academic life. However, whilst the claims made for its 
benefits, or limitations, are diverse in character and provenance, it is possible to 
identify one significant source as being related to modes of academic 
governance. This relation has significant effects, but is also obscured by the 
heterogeneity of wider claims. A critical analysis of the relation is therefore 
needed in order to assess its significance for sociology: however, the mode of 
governance in question itself poses challenges to the idea or project of 
sociological critique. This paper therefore attempts firstly to clarify the 
specificity of interdisciplinarity as a feature of academic governance, and 
secondly, drawing upon Boltanski’s recent reformulation of sociological critique, 
to begin a critical analysis of its significance for sociology within this particular 
governmental context. 
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Introduction 
Interdisciplinarity is an inescapable feature of the academic landscape today, as 
a dominant theme and priority in research policy, as a widely proliferating form 
of practice (Biagioli, 2009), and as a field of study in its own right (Frodeman, 
2010). It is highly valued in organisations with responsibility for funding 
research, such as research councils. For example, the removal of barriers to 
interdisciplinarity was cited as a major reason for the recent reorganization of 
postgraduate research training in the UK: while it is arguable whether this or 
administrative efficiency was the key factor, its invocation underlines its current 
rhetorical value. Its benefits may be taken to be self-evident, since the term of 
itself seems to point beyond the parochialism and conservatism of work within 
single disciplines, many of which came into being some time ago and whose 
formal continuity can be seen to constrain new ideas. 
 
That said, even a cursory look at some of the claims made for it shows that 
interdisciplinarity is subject to widely divergent assessments of its significance 
and status, and positively or negatively evaluated in relation to a number of 
questions and issues: for example, whether the complexity of the world requires 
it; whether it is essential to innovative or creative work; whether it implies or 
requires a particular theory; whether it is epistemologically possible; and 
whether it facilitates or hinders critical social science. The range of claims made 
for it in turn raises the legitimate question of whether it is coherent to think of 
interdisciplinarity as one thing: for it is notable that different estimations of its 
value themselves often rely on different prior definitions of its meaning. 
 
This diversity can obscure the fact that calls for interdisciplinarity may play a 
significant role in what Gibbons et al (1994) have described as a fundamental 
shift in knowledge production. While this particular account has been criticised 
on a number of grounds, it usefully draws attention to the strategic importance 
of interdisciplinarity for certain forms of academic governance, and 
consequently to one reason for its frequently positive valuation. Thus, on the one 
hand, interdisciplinarity can be invoked in many different ways and in the 
service of many different causes; and, on the other, it has a significant presence 
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within a relatively dominant form of discourse ‘through which we, not quite out 
of choice and not quite out of necessity, make judgments’ (Davies, 2005: 1). This 
double aspect of interdisciplinarity poses a challenge for critical sociological 
thought: the diversity of possible meanings resisting clear definition or 
attribution, and the embeddedness of the would-be thinker within these forms of 
governance mitigating against clear critical perspectives (cf Latimer and Skeggs, 
2011; Boden and Epstein, 2011). The challenge is exacerbated if we accept 
Boltanski’s assertion that these very governmental forms represent a specific 
type of domination that absorbs critique (2011: 137-8). 
 
This paper therefore considers the question of interdisciplinarity and its 
significance for sociology today, not in order to establish some definitive 
meaning of interdisciplinarity (although we try to indicate why that is not 
possible) but rather to make a contribution to critical thinking about the place of 
sociology within current forms of governance; and, correlatively, to use the issue 
of interdisciplinarity to explore the question of critical sociology in the light of  
some recent objections (see for example Latour, 2004). The paper therefore can 
be described as an attempt to articulate the relations between interdisciplinarity, 
governance and critical sociology. 
 
These issues are addressed and approached in the following way. We begin by 
reviewing some different characterisations of, and claims made for, 
interdisciplinarity, indicating their diversity, noting some recurrent themes, and 
briefly considering the possible shaping effects of different contexts. Having 
indicated the radical diversity of these characterisations and claims, we then 
turn to the question of academic governance, looking at injunctions to be 
interdisciplinary and attempting to contextualise their significance for academic 
knowledge in general, and sociology in particular. In the light of this, we then 
consider the wider question of the place and character of critical sociology 
within this governmental context. 
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Calls to and claims for interdisciplinarity 
The relation between interdisciplinarity and academic governance, though 
significant, does not exhaust the meanings and implied politics of 
interdisciplinarity, which are highly diverse.  We therefore begin by outlining 
this diversity, not only to qualify and delimit the argument that we will go on to 
make, but also because this very diversity plays an important role in shaping the 
ways in which calls to be interdisciplinary may be heard. We note some key 
issues and criteria that run through the diverse claims made: in particular, 
epistemological arguments bearing on the nature of the world and the kind of 
knowledge needed to address it, and evaluative judgments that are based upon 
them. We also consider the possible relevance of national and institutional 
contexts for some of the positions adopted. 
 
The term itself is a relatively loose one and can denote quite distinct forms of 
organization. For example, it can in principle refer to a process of exchanging 
ideas across given disciplinary boundaries, or to a conceptual space in between 
those boundaries where work is done: in the former, disciplines are preserved, 
whereas the latter promises the possibility of new conceptual development 
outside of the disciplinary framework and suggests the possibility of a 
dissolution of disciplines and more creative non-disciplinary work (Sayer, 2000). 
Different evaluations of its worth do not always make clear which of these or 
other forms are being referencedi.  
 
One illustration of this complexity is provided by Derrida who, whilst arguing 
against the constraining nature of disciplines, sees interdisciplinarity as part of 
that very constraining structure. Making a case to the French Government for a 
new college of philosophy, he contrasts the potentially radical approach that he 
is proposing with the conservatism of interdisciplinarity which he defines as: ‘a 
programmed cooperation between the representatives of the established 
sciences that would study a common object, itself already defined in its contours, 
with the help of different methods and complementary approaches [..] 
interdisciplinarity thus understood does not institute a novel problematic and 
does not invent new objects’ (Derrida, 2004: 209). This statement appears to 
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concur with recurrent research policy formulations that those structures which 
preserve disciplines act against the possibility of innovative work; however, 
interdisciplinarity is here taken to entail rather than challenge this very 
preservation.  
 
This exemplifies what Krishnan sees as fundamental definitional problems 
associated with ‘interdisciplinarity’, which is used to describe a ‘range of very 
different concepts […] which are often talked about as if they were just one 
(2009: 6). Moreover, he notes that there are prior problems about how 
disciplines themselves are defined, even though their identity is often taken as 
given. It is therefore not surprising that interpretations and evaluations of 
interdisciplinarity in turn are heterogeneous. 
 
One response to, and symptom of, this heterogeneity is to distinguish between 
and construct typologies of the different forms that it can take. Luhmann for 
example distinguishes three forms: occasional interdisciplinarity, summarised 
by Wellbery as ‘enrichment through contingent encounter’ (Wellbery, 2009: 
988), problem-oriented interdisciplinarity, and transdisciplinarity, referring to 
theories that cannot be said to have a specific disciplinary home since they were 
intended from the outset to have wide applicability (ibid: 987-8). Klein (2010) 
reviews some key taxonomies to date, elaborates a relatively complex model 
based on the ‘core vocabulary’ of multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary and 
transdisciplinary (ibid: 15), and sets out sub-categories based on forms and 
degrees of exchange and integration. She notes in passing that taxonomies of 
knowledge since the late 19th Century ‘have been dominated by a system of 
disciplinarity that demarcates domains of specialized inquiry’ (ibid), but that 
these taxonomies have subsequently been challenged by the rise of 
interdisciplinarity. Taxonomies of interdisciplinarity clearly have a useful 
heuristic function, but there is a possible tension between some of the claims 
made for the value of interdisciplinarity – as creative, as transgressive of 
systemic organisation for example – and the attempt to classify it in a systematic 
manner. 
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The issue of epistemology is central to any assessment of the value of 
interdisciplinarity, even if it is not always explicitly thematized in discussions. 
Derrida’s statement, above, exemplifies what we can loosely call a constructivist 
epistemological approach, in which objects of study are in some sense the 
outcomes of the frames through which they are studied. This can be 
conceptualised in different ways, from Heidegger’s argument that ‘every science 
is based on the projection of a bounded object domain’ (2002: 63) to Foucault’s 
assertion that discourses  ‘are practices that systematically form the objects of 
which they speak’ (1972: 49). Even some more explicitly objectivist approaches 
such as Durkheim’s, which would take issue with this kind of constructionist 
argument, would concur that there are specific domains of objects for specific 
disciplines, and that the latter derive their legitimacy from the former 
(Durkheim, 1982)ii. In each case there is a strong sense that what we might call 
an intuitive model of interdisciplinarity which derives its purported value from 
the novel combining of different views of a common object is problematised, 
since each approach (whether we see this in terms of a discipline or something 
more specific such as a discourseiii) creates its own object.  
 
Conversely, some argue that the (actual) complexity of the world necessitates an 
interdisciplinary approach, and that work within any one disciplinary 
perspective or paradigm is therefore likely at best to be inadequate, or at worst 
to actively hinder the possibility of true understanding. Turner has taken issue 
with arguments that suggest that the increasing complexity of the world requires 
the formulation of new theoretical resources, including the adoption of ideas 
from other disciplines. Such arguments, he suggests, confuse formal and 
substantive theory, and often involve a ‘false appeal to topicality’ (Turner, 2010: 
31). This cautionary note is worth consideration when looking at examples of 
recent calls for interdisciplinarity. 
 
Contributors to Bhaskar et al (2010) provide one example of the argument from 
complexity. They see climate change as a challenge for the way knowledge is 
produced, arguing for the necessity of an interdisciplinary approach: as Naess 
notes, the nature of the problem, involving as it does ‘interactions between 
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human societies and the natural environment’ (2010: 54), makes it imperative 
that ‘disciplinary tunnel vision’ is avoided. Latour (1993) makes a – formally – 
similar argument, in which climate change figures as a prominent example, 
suggesting that the proliferation and complexity of connections and associations 
within the world overwhelm the modernist attempt to impose a disciplinary 
order upon them: such an attempt is necessarily conceptually reductionist, 
where reductionism is seen to be both problematic and in principle avoidable.  
 
Another important strand of evaluative argument runs though much discussion: 
namely the assumption that interdisciplinarity is inherently, possibly morally, 
preferable in that it represents a more open, plural and democratic approach to 
knowledge production, in implicit or explicit contrast to the dogmatism and 
conservatism of disciplinary work. Indeed, some argue that simply advocating 
the value of an overtly disciplinary approach in a domain defined in substantive 
terms, and already occupied by different disciplines, is in itself highly 
problematic in this respect. Sayer (2000) for instance, sees the advocacy of a 
particular discipline in precisely these terms: not only are single disciplines ill 
equipped to address concrete problems in the world, but the advocacy of their 
value may lead to disciplinary imperialism, where the sociologist (in this case) 
loses sight of the partiality of any perspective and claims or assumes privileged 
insight into the object of study. Some forms of sociology, Sayer suggests, are 
particularly prone to this. Constructivism for instance, in defining a sociological 
approach in largely conceptual and epistemological terms, removes the 
possibility of clearly bounded object domains and is able to claim sociological 
expertise in all manner of matters. Moreover, if the sociologist then claims an 
understanding of the constructed nature of reality that is not in principle 
available to non-sociologists, the problem is exacerbated.  
 
Some of Shove’s recent work provides a forceful refusal of this kind of position: 
she has argued that dominant policy frameworks within the general area of 
climate change and sustainable living rest upon inadequate theorisations of how 
people act, and proposed a different model of social practice (Shove, 2010). It 
happens that the former theorisations are psychological, the latter explicitly 
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sociological, and it has therefore been argued that her proposal is too doctrinaire 
given the need for interdisciplinary collaboration (Whitmarsh et al 2011, 262); 
her response (Shove, 2011) is unapologetic in refusing the appeal to openness 
and pointing instead to the Kuhnian thesis that paradigms are incommensurable. 
Shove resists the rhetoric of openness in this context by arguing for its 
epistemological incoherence.  
 
It can also be argued that Sayer’s opposition of constructivist to a-disciplinary 
problem solving approaches (about which we will say more) may be too simple 
and that, for all its pragmatism, the call for problem solving can not in fact 
bypass questions of epistemology. Wellbery usefully notes that the problem-
solving variant of interdisciplinarity still involves an epistemological issue, one, 
we would argue, that receives insufficient attention: that is, the object of study is 
constituted as a theoretical object within each participating discipline, but also 
exists as an object within informal natural language (Wellbery, 2009). This 
double constitution can lead to uncertainties that sometimes characterise the 
practice of interdisciplinarityiv.  
 
The possible significance of national and institutional specificities also needs to 
be considered in trying to make sense of the variety of arguments. Abbott 
conveys something of the particular significance that disciplines have had in the 
development of the American University: the disciplinary system of departments 
is ‘uniquely powerful and powerfully unique’ and is central to the careers and 
hiring of academics (Abbott, 2001: 128). This centrality has consequences for 
attempts to develop interdisciplinarity and certainly would appear to be relevant 
to some of the arguments made in support of the positive effects 
(epistemological, critical, moral) claimed for it by some American academics. 
Biagioli (2009) for example, argues strongly for the value of interdisciplinary 
collaboration between the humanities and science and technology studies (STS) 
– neither of which, we should note, is a single discipline – and in so doing 
subscribes to the widely held view that working within single disciplines can be 
constraining, pointing to the success of STS and attributing this largely to its 
intellectual configuration; and certainly the institutional history of STS centres 
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and their sometimes troubled relationships with established departments in the 
USA would seem highly pertinent. If Biagioli’s main concern is intellectual 
vitality, Butler (2009), in a different field, pushes the argument in a more overtly 
‘political’ direction, invoking a form of interdisciplinarity as a source of 
resistance to instrumental forms of governance, where vested interests can have 
a deleterious effect on the quality of academic and public debate.  
 
However, the evidence suggests that the diversity of positions is not reducible to 
national contexts even if the latter play some part in shaping them. Marshall 
Sahlins (2009) for example joins others who, in locating the call to 
interdisciplinarity within wider political and policy agendas, take a more critical 
view of its significance. For Sahlins (2009) and Muller (2009), the move towards 
interdisciplinarity is a manifestation of new forms of academic governance that 
embody an implicitly or explicitly critical stance towards disciplines and 
disciplinary knowledge, and introduce more instrumental forms of value. This 
contrasts with Butler’s position, even though the shared concern is the extension 
of instrumental forms of governance: the key difference is perhaps where vested 
interests are seen to lie. 
 
There is then no consensus on the meaning, value or significance of 
interdisciplinarity, which is constructed in different ways for different purposes; 
moreover these constructions may themselves bear traces of disciplinarity, while 
purportedly neutral or sceptical accounts, such as this one, may themselves be 
interdisciplinaryv. But if it is fruitless to attempt to specify an essential meaning 
or make a general evaluation, both Sahlins and Muller do direct our attention to 
the significance of the institutional provenance of some recent calls to 
interdisplinarity. Why are academics currently subject to such apparently 
relentless encouragement to be interdisciplinary? 
 
Innovation, problem solving and governance 
For Muller (2009), recent calls for interdisciplinarity are problematic because 
they originate and derive their value from a new source: the utility of research 
and scholarship is no longer defined within the academy, let alone disciplines, 
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while innovation is articulated within a market-derived discourse of production. 
This represents a turn away from disciplinary knowledge and a move towards 
other criteria of evaluation and accountability which are external to disciplines 
within the sphere of research; furthermore he argues that in both research and 
the parallel sphere of education it can serve more explicit purposes. Stable 
disciplines can form points of resistance to policy initiatives such as 
modularisation, curriculum integration, and related structural changes; thus 
interdisciplinarity becomes an element in such initiatives, at a time when 
programmatisation and regionalisation – where knowledge production is 
organised around regions of empirical study – are seen as virtuous policy 
objectives in themselves (ibid: 211-13). The discipline, in this formulation, is 
seen as a necessary point of resistance to emerging forms of governance. 
 
Whilst, as we have seen, the very heterogeneity of interdisciplinary discourse 
mitigates against the possibility of reducing it purely to a feature of governance – 
but also perhaps obscures the identification of its role within governance – there 
are two key thematic strands that we have touched on that tie interdisciplinarity 
to contemporary forms of governance: innovation, and problem solving. We 
consider each in turn.  
 
The idea that interdisciplinarity is a source of innovation provides one of its 
most frequently invoked justifications, where the disciplinary matrix, well 
established as it is, necessarily constrains creative thought. There is a clear 
implication here that interdisciplinary means modern, although it is worth 
noting that such claims are by no means new and can be traced back, in the social 
sciences in the USA, to the 1930s (Abbott, 2001: 131 et seq). However the term 
innovation, whilst it has a longstanding general meaning, has some very specific 
connotations today which merit consideration. 
 
Nowotny (2006: 4) asks ‘why has the quest for innovation become so 
omnipresent at the beginning of the twenty-first century?’ and argues that it ‘fills 
a conceptual void in our collective imagining of the future’ (ibid: 5). The ways in 
which we think the future in the face of uncertainties of various kinds have 
 11 
changed, she argues, and are now less naïve and more reflexive in the sense that 
societies attempt to control rather than simply anticipate: she singles out the 
increasing sophistication of mathematical tools used in financial markets to 
illustrate this point (ibid). 
 
In the light of subsequent events this example is unfortunate at best, and raises 
serious questions about Nowotny’s apparent confidence in the ability of 
technological societies to exert more control over the future; and we might also 
question her acceptance that innovation is a necessity in the current socio-
economic context, or the underlying thesis that the latter is as specific in its 
mode of imagining as she takes it to be. However, her identification of the key 
role played by innovation in modern societies and economies seems empirically 
accurate. ‘Today, all highly industrialized nation-states have developed a set of 
policy tools to foster technological innovation and investment in research’ (ibid: 
6). The drive for innovation can, then, be related to the perceived need for 
economically relevant research in particular kinds of economies, and comes to be 
seen as a responsibility of government. Hence, the governance of research 
becomes preoccupied with the encouragement of innovation, understood in this 
particular sense: and the increasingly loud call to be interdisciplinary results 
from this governmental shift. The link is clearly apparent in Nettelbeck’s 
assertion that: ‘[i]nnovation is often the result of new combinations of 
disciplines, collaborations between science and culture at large, between ideas 
and technological opportunities, and between theoretical and practical concerns’ 
(2006: 192). 
 
Since interdisciplinarity has such a strong link to the ‘practical concerns’ of 
governance, it is unsurprising that a dominant theme in the discussion of 
interdisciplinarity has been problem solving. Calls for interdisciplinarity, 
explanations of its provenance or necessity, considerations of its value or wider 
implications – these are frequently constituted within a discursive space in 
which interdisciplinarity is inextricably linked to problem solving: indeed, the 
prevalence of this linkage might legitimately be described as a dominant 
articulation (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Whilst not all references to problem 
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solving are endorsements, it is perhaps worth noting that the term, for all its 
simplicity, has a potentially coercive rhetoric: for although on the one hand it 
designates a specific approach to knowledge, on the other it implies, in more 
general terms, the apparent lack of utility of other approaches particularly, 
within this articulation, disciplinary approaches. Who, on this terrain, would be 
comfortable defending an approach that could not solve problems? 
 
Hadorn et al (2010) provide an in some ways characteristic formulation: 
‘Problem solving in the real world is an important driver for integrative and 
collaborative research’ (Hadorn et al, 2010: 431). Here problem solving provides 
a causal explanation for the emergence of (to use their term) transdisciplinary 
research. Moreover, as they go on to argue, the ‘problem-directed’ research that 
is the result of this process ‘transgresses academic cultures and engages in 
mutual learning with societal actors in order to account for barriers in real life’ 
(ibid). The contrast between ‘real world’ or ‘real life’ and the ‘academic cultures’ 
that by implication lack connection to these entities could hardly be clearervi. 
The emphasis here is on the application of knowledge to solve problems, and this 
is frequently linked to the notion of the complexity of the (real) world already 
discussed: if complexity challenges individual disciplines’ capacity to adequately 
understand the world, no less does it challenge their ability to solve the 
problems that it throws up (Bhaskar et al, 2010).  
 
Strathern’s (2004) more nuanced account appears to concur that problem 
solving is a key dynamic for the development of knowledge. One way that the 
social sciences have always advanced, she argues, is in response to issues and 
problems using, in the first instance, tools that are to hand. However, she 
suggests, where these problems acquire a certain momentum and take on the 
form of a crisis, the diversity of circumstances that constitute them, which we 
might gloss as complexity, may require diverse approaches: and indeed ‘such 
situations are often identifiable by the multi- or interdisciplinary nature of the 
expertise they seem to summon’ (ibid, 2, original emphasis). Crises then summon 
interdisciplinarity, even to the extent that the emergence of interdisciplinarity 
can itself be taken as a marker of the emergence of a crisis. 
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The problem solving formulation plays a key role in Gibbons et al’s (1994) 
influential argument that a shift in modes of knowledge production is underway: 
they identify, amongst other things, a move away from academic and disciplinary 
knowledge towards problem-solving research which is carried out in the field of 
application. Research, here, becomes interdisciplinary by virtue of its essentially 
pragmatic approach towards knowledge production and use, the movement 
away from discipline based research being at the same time a movement 
towards application. Holmwood (2010), in a consideration of the development of 
this new mode of knowledge production for sociology, presents Gibbons et al’s 
account as a useful description of contemporary forms of governance, but also 
endorses Pestre’s argument that the concept of mode 2 knowledge underplays 
issues of power and thereby serves to ‘”naturalise” the processes by which it has 
come about’ (ibid: 653). Similarly, it has been criticised for tacitly endorsing 
what it purports merely to describe (Godin, 1998); and, we would add, it falls 
short of critically considering the link between calls for interdisciplinary 
research and the devaluation of disciplinary knowledge that is implicit, 
sometimes explicit, in the parallel move towards ‘transferable skills’ in teaching. 
 
This points towards an important aspect of the alleged shortcomings of the mode 
2 thesis, namely its possible complicity with or uncritical stance towards 
neoliberalismvii. We now look at this in a little more detail. 
 
Critical sociology and neoliberalism 
Mirowski and Sent (2008) see the mode 2 thesis as a clear exemplification of a 
tendency within Science and Technology Studies to elide questions of politics 
and thereby to fail to confront the effects of neoliberal governance on science 
and knowledge. Thus, they suggest, Gibbons et al tend to uncritically describe a 
set of characteristics which in their view could and should have been related to 
the commercialisation of knowledge; while the follow up volume (Nowotny et al, 
2001) goes further in ‘casting mode 2 as a change in the epistemological 
presumptions of the actors’ (Mirowski and Sent, 2008: 667). Certainly it is 
notable that Nowotny et al (2001) talk, in relatively uncritical terms, of 
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transformations in forms of accountability which are seen to result from 
epistemological developments rather than new forms and structures of 
governance.  
 
Mirowski and Sent thus cast a more critical light on the contemporary 
governance of knowledge, with implications for the way we read calls for 
interdisciplinary work. Invocations about the value of interdisciplinary work are 
often posed in terms of ‘epistemological presumptions’ and benefits, but less 
often related to forms of academic governance. Certainly there are suggestive 
continuities between the language sometimes used in discussions of 
interdisciplinarity: we have already considered the key role of ‘innovation’, but 
other terms such as flexibility, networks echo the language of management (cf 
Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005)viii.  
 
We might therefore be tempted, following Mirowski and Sent, to regard calls for 
interdisciplinarity primarily as ideological features or symptoms of neoliberal 
managerial regimes. At the very least, it is surely necessary to question the kind 
of line taken by enthusiasts such as Klein (2009: 2), who regards the interests of 
‘administrators’ and ‘faculty’ in promoting interdisciplinarity as being entirely 
consonant, and who sees problems only in the structural and cultural obstacles 
to its achievement. However, both the particular character of sociology as a 
discipline, and recent discussions about what it is to be critical (in general terms, 
and in the current socio-economic context) need to be considered in order to 
attempt the formulation of an appropriate critical response. 
 
Sociology itself does not have a unitary or clearly bounded structure (Urry, 
1995). Bernstein (2000) describes it as an example of a horizontal knowledge 
structure, meaning that it comprises a series of specialised codes or languages 
(corresponding to theoretical approaches) and that, unlike hierarchical 
knowledge structures, it lacks any integrating codes that could provide for the 
development of general theory (ibid: 161-3). Abbott’s (2001) comments on the 
fractal structure of the discipline are also apposite in this respect, differences 
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between sociology and other disciplines being replicated at other levels between 
different kinds of sociology.  
 
Thus it can be argued that sociology’s own structure, the fact that it is already in 
some respects inherently interdisciplinary (Holmwood, 2010) has particular 
practical significance for collaboration with other disciplines, and even that its 
structure helps place it in an awkward position in relation to new forms of 
academic governance. Holmwood argues that its fragmentation and the fact that 
it has relatively weak boundaries make it particularly vulnerable to current 
‘mode 2’ regimes of governance, where the emphasis on interdisciplinary applied 
studies could mean that its role as an exporter rather than importer of 
knowledge will threaten its continued existenceix.  
 
Holmwood sees sociology as a definitively critical discipline and his article, like 
this one, is devoted to articulating an appropriately critical response to the 
developments in academic governance with which he is concerned. However, the 
senses in which sociology can be seen as critical are themselves related to the 
fractured structure of the discipline that he notes; while the notion of a critical 
social science has recently been contested both within and beyond sociology’s 
boundaries, and in ways that clearly bear on the question of disciplinary identity 
and expertise.  
 
While we share Holmwood’s view that sociology is a critical discipline, there is 
little agreement about what is or should be meant by critical sociology. In the 
first place there are sociologies which explicitly eschew the social criticism that 
many would regard as the purpose of the discipline: ethnomethodological 
studies, and Garfinkel’s warnings that their value is lost if they are ‘done as 
ironies’ (1984: viii), constitute the clearest example, even if it can be argued that 
these warnings themselves are evidence of a critical sensibility redirected 
towards other forms of sociology. In the second place, those forms of sociology 
that do describe themselves as critical can conceptualise the task of criticism in 
very different ways: for example, notwithstanding the frequent conflation of the 
terms normative and critical, we can distinguish explicitly normative forms of 
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sociology, where criticism is seen logically to require the elaboration of norms of 
action and conduct, and forms that either avoid or explicitly argue against this 
model: Butler (2004: 355), from the latter position, gives a clear rationale for 
making the distinction. There are also, of course, a number of other approaches 
which could be partially related to these but diverge in important respects. 
Bernstein’s and Abbott’s descriptions of the discipline, in other words, have 
relevance not only for styles of work but also for foundational conceptions of the 
discipline’s character and purpose, including the sense in which it is critical. 
 
Moreover, the issues of the boundedness and critical character of the discipline 
have become closely linked in some recent work. The criticism of critique, and 
particularly of the (ethical and epistemological) problems of assuming a kind of 
professional expertise that is not available to those being studied is not a new 
theme in sociology, but it has been recently been articulated in a particular way 
by Latour (2004) and others in actor network theory (Law, 2008), an approach 
which could not be easily located either within or beyond the boundaries of 
sociology, and which questions the identity of the discipline in so far as it relies 
upon the identification of a bounded domain of study, the social; criticism of the 
disciplinary claim to expertise, here, is derived in part from scepticism towards 
the feasibility of a bounded object domain. This influential line of argument 
however makes the formulation of a critical sociology a more uncertain task, 
unless we follow Scott in arguing for the preservation of a relatively traditional 
view of the discipline as being that body of work which studies and understands 
the social (Scott 2005, 2010)x. 
 
The formulation of a critical and reflexive understanding of the conditions in 
which sociological work is produced is thus, perhaps, an increasingly difficult if 
still important task. The recent work of Luc Boltanski (2011), whose 
reservations about denunciation provided an important source for Latour, but 
who retains a clearer orientation to the discipline of sociology and the necessity 
of social criticism, provides some useful insights: in particular, through his focus 
on some of the characteristic features of domination in neoliberal regimes, and 
their significance for the formulation of a critical sociology. 
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Boltanksi’s guiding thread in ‘On Critique’ (2011) is that, for all the justifiable 
criticisms (including his own) that have been levelled at critique in so far as it 
tends towards denunciation, critique in some form remains indispensable to 
social science, not least because it is part of everyday life. He therefore attempts 
to specify a form of critique that is attentive to the relation between critique in 
everyday life and in social science, and crucially which avoids formulating that 
relation in terms of the deficiencies of the former, or the in principle general 
unavailability of the insights of the latter. Boltanski regards this as crucial if 
social science is to construct an adequate and credible ‘metacritique of 
domination’ (ibid: 48). A crucial feature of his model is that critique needs to be 
built from an empirical analysis of the ‘the social operations which give reality its 
contours and the social operations that aim to challenge it’ (ibid: 49). This being 
the case, Boltanski’s argument, whilst making some general points, takes the 
form of a critical analysis of some of the institutional forms of domination that 
characterise neoliberal governance and the specification of the difficulties that 
confront a critical sociology in this institutional context. 
 
Boltanski argues that the assimilation between volition and necessity, although 
‘associated with totalitarian regimes invoking a determinist philosophy of 
history, is a commonplace of modes of governance of advanced capitalism’ (ibid: 
130); and he notes that the same rhetoric is a feature of neoliberal styles of 
management. Change being presented as inevitable, different forms of expertise 
are then needed to produce an understanding of what that change will be. The 
rhetorical invocation of necessity serves to legitimate domination, while the 
work of experts has a performative aspect in that their models constitute and 
reinforce the reality that is the correlate of necessity. This constitution of reality 
by forms of expert knowledge, according to Boltanski, renders it more 
impervious to critique: ‘[c]urrently, it is the closure of reality on itself that 
discourages critique’ (ibid: 156) and particularly that form of critique that 
attempts to denounce realities as simply constructs (ibid: 131)xi.  
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The world increasingly becomes what can be known through science, which 
moreover takes a particular form: ‘the so-called natural sciences and the human 
or social sciences, which are increasingly closely combined with one another to 
the point of confusion’ (ibid). Thus, although the topic of interdisciplinarity is not 
Boltanski’s central focus, it can be read as being clearly related to the ‘political 
metaphysics underlying this form of domination’ (ibid). Moreover, if this 
argument is accepted, the recurrent assertion that interdisciplinarity is 
necessary to solve problems or deal with the complexity of the world can also be 
located within this metaphysics: that which is said to be complex or problematic 
being invoked as a given feature of an apparently autonomous reality. Similarly, 
Nowotny’s apparent endorsement, qualified though it may be, that the need for 
innovation is something that has to be ‘recognized’ (2006: 6) is discursively 
equivalent. 
 
It cannot be argued that interdisciplinarity is simply coterminous with 
neoliberalism, as the diversity of different claims made for it from very different 
positions should have already made clear. For example, Boltanski notes the 
increasing reliance upon forms of benchmarking, where organisations or 
institutions are ranked against a norm, usually one of efficiency. Academics in 
the UK will clearly recognise this as a description of the Research Excellence 
Framework (REF), of cognate measurement systems in higher education, and of 
the criteria that are built into them; but interdisciplinarity often has a 
problematic status in research assessments, which tend to be organised along 
disciplinary lines, even if their emphasis on impact sits well with the move 
towards problem solving and application that provide much of the institutional 
justification for interdisciplinary work. Given these contradictory features, and 
the heterogeneous nature of the wider claims made for interdisciplinarity, the 
latter can not be accounted for purely in terms of its functionality for systems of 
governance: but that does not negate the significance of the particular way it has 
been articulated within neoliberal discourse and practice. 
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Conclusion  
We have addressed some of the many different claims that have been made for 
the merits and demerits of interdisciplinarity, not in order to make a judgment 
on its value per se, but to pick out one particular thread and trace its connections 
to contemporary forms of governance; we have also suggested that the 
heterogeneity of claims made for interdisciplinarity serves to obscure this 
thread. We conclude by emphasizing some of the difficulties of producing a 
critical or even considered response to the call for interdisciplinarity when the 
author is so clearly located within the objects of interest. 
 
As we have briefly noted, but as has been widely debated elsewhere, the 
disciplinary status of sociology is itself pertinent. This article has argued, from a 
particular sociological perspective, against certain forms of advocacy of 
interdisciplinarity, but as the reader will have noted, it draws freely on literature 
from beyond the discipline. Moreover, although this plays a minor explicit part in 
the article, the author has himself been working on an interdisciplinary research 
project for five years. Here and elsewhere, there are some elements of paradox; 
and it is, we hope, empirically evident that this article is not ‘against’ 
interdisciplinarity in any simple sense. 
 
Boltanski (2011) notes that one of the hermeneutic contradictions with which 
critique has to engage is the uncertain relation between the institution and its 
spokespersons. This is certainly a widespread and recognisable problem in 
everyday life – witness the interactional difficulty of registering a complaint 
against an organisation when the phone is answered by an employee in a call 
centre; but it takes on a further dimension in Higher Education, where many of 
the functions of (neoliberal) governance are carried out by academics. This does 
not necessarily imply compliance in a straightforward or ideological sense: it is, 
for example, possible to disagree with the need for ethics committees but agree 
to serve on them and try to offset their excesses; but it is an example of ‘the 
complex ways in which we have become embedded’ in processes of governance 
(Latimer and Skeggs, 2011: 393). These forms of governance become an 
inescapable part of an academic’s life, no matter what his or her attitude to some 
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of its explicit and implicit criteria; and we can observe, perhaps with regret, the 
way some of the latter become internalised and made manifest in our own forms 
of talk and practice. This embeddedness in the phenomena of critical interest 
provides one reason why critique in its older sense has become problematic, 
relying as it does on the possibility of an external analytical vantage point.  
 
Boltanski concludes his book by noting that critical sociology today, given the 
problems he has identified with conventional notions of critique and his analysis 
of the context within which it works, has something impossible about it; but that 
its role is clear. This is to help ‘ordinary’ people, with whom it is in constant 
proximity ‘maintain themselves in the state of constant imbalance in the absence 
of which […] domination would in fact seize hold of everything’ (Boltanski, 2011: 
160). If, as here, we consider those in some ways even more proximate people 
working in Universities, his message is surely equally applicable. It is not the 
intention of this article, nor would it be feasible, to come to definitive 
conclusions about the general desirability of something that is both very diverse 
and part of the texture of academic life, and the article would have 
performatively defeated its author if he had attempted to do this. But it is 
important to try to be critically vigilant about the governmental terrain that we 
inhabit, and the relation that this may have to intellectual claims that seek to 
present themselves as self-evident. However, it is also necessary to consider that 
the sense and practice of being critical are not given but need continual 
refinement. Interdisciplinarity is too diverse to be reduced to an ideological 
effect; but equally, it would be mistaken to neglect its significance for the 
systems of governance within which the would-be critical sociologist is also 
embedded. 
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i A detailed critical analysis of claims made by adherents of interdisciplinarity can be found in 
Jacobs and Frickel (2009). 
ii This is an oversimplication: for indications of why, see Durkheim (2005) and Cooper et al 
(2009). 
iii Wellbery (2009) notes that discourses and disciplines are not co-extensive in the way they are 
sometimes taken to be, for instance in Foucault; see also Krishnan (2009). 
iv The author’s experience on a recent interdisciplinary project bears this point out: ‘values’ for 
example, has general intelligibility but different connotations in sociology and social psychology. 
(Research Group on Lifestyle, Values and Energy Consumption, funded by ESRC, grant no 
RN0130D.) 
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v Some disciplines are more open to interdisciplinarity than others (Muller, 2009), just as others 
exhibit in fractal form internal differences that make collaboration within a discipline a project in 
its own right (Abbott, 2001). 
vi The model that Hadorn et al set out is more complex than this extract implies, referring to the 
need for a recursive approach which can, amongst other things, address the unintended effects of 
problem solving. 
vii Another key aspect is its historical adequacy: see for example Weingart (2010). 
viii Even Strathern’s (2004) argument that crises play a key role in summoning interdisciplinary 
work has an interesting relation to the critical role played by crises within forms of managerial 
domination, as identified by Boltanski (2011). 
ix Objections have been raised to this aspect of Holmwood’s argument (Rosenfeld, 2010; Savage, 
2010).  
x See Stanley (2005) for a critique that stresses the significance of sociology’s hybridity. 
xi However, he later notes that antagonisms between realism and constructionism are 
characteristic of this mode of domination’s dependence on expertise (Boltanski, 2011: 139): this 
he sees as one of the hermeneutic contradictions of the managerial mode of domination.  
